Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia by Sumit Ganguly S. Paul Kapur

Author:Sumit Ganguly, S. Paul Kapur [Sumit Ganguly, S. Paul Kapur]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780804755504
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Published: 2007-03-07T00:00:00+00:00

The conduct of the war

With the plan formulated, Pakistan proceeded to deploy the forces of the NLI into positions vacated by Indian troops in the heights above Kargil. As the plan was being put into effect, it became evident to the infiltrating soldiers that India was paying little heed to the region. As a result, Pakistan’s planners found they could advance further than initially intended. What was supposed to be the seizing and holding of a small number of posts expanded into the projection of force well across the LoC into Indian-held Kashmir, and ultimately the occupation of a 200-kilometer stretch of territory. India’s failure to reconnoiter the area during the winter and therefore to observe the forward movements of the NLI allowed Pakistan to make significant advances without opposition.

A combination of “mission creep” and battlefield initiative contributed to Pakistan’s initial success. Before the incursion began, Pakistan’s small number of planners apparently had limited objectives, but expanded opportunity opened the door for expanded operations. Shaukat Qadir, a retired Pakistani brigadier general, wrote, “The operation was, in my view, not intended to reach the scale that it finally did. In all likelihood, it grew in scale as the troops crept forward to find more unoccupied heights, until finally they were overlooking the valley.”19 Once they saw their advantage, ground commanders could not resist seizing the available opportunities, leaving headquarters to adjust its objectives accordingly. Once in the field, it can be difficult to prevent commanders from seizing available opportunities to improve their position. Cordoning off a larger defense perimeter in order to defend the primary objective would provide room to defend and, if necessary, to retreat without forfeiting the primary objective. Pakistani analysts and interlocutors in the Lavoy volume thus argue that Pakistan was a victim of its own success, as the forces expanded well beyond the original plan.

This underscores the problem of maintaining political control in war, when battlefield progress can influence strategic objectives. In the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, for example, India easily attained certain military objectives, which provided the opportunity to expand the political objectives. In the view of one of India’s commanding generals at the time, New Delhi’s original political goal was to liberate only enough East Pakistani territory to allow the formation of a “free” government outside Dacca. When Pakistan’s defense collapsed, however, New Delhi changed its political objectives.20 In the Kargil conflict, the military leaders did not anticipate before the war that they would have such an easy time of it. The results for Pakistan in 1999, however, were less positive than for India in 1971.

Once India identified the Pakistani forces and their positions, Pakistan’s trouble began. India escalated at the point of Pakistan’s attack and the weaknesses created by the early NLI battlefield success were consequently exposed. The NLI had been established as a defensive force, but having gained its initial defensive positions in the Kargil heights, the irresistible pull of mission creep allowed the NLI to move into offensive positions. Unfortunately, the NLI was not well suited for offensive maneuvers, and once India counter-attacked, this weakness was evident.

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